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U.S. officials urge Americans to use encrypted apps amid unprecedented cyberattack
(www.nbcnews.com)
This is a most excellent place for technology news and articles.
Thats a different tech. End to end is cut and dry how it works. If you do anything to data mine it, it's not end to end anymore.
Only the users involved in end to end can access the data in that chat. Everyone else sees encrypted data, i.e noise. If there are any backdoors or any methods to pull data out, you can't bill it as end to end.
You are suggesting that "end-to-end" is some kind of legally codified phrase. It just isn't. If Google were to steal data from a system claiming to be end-to-end encrypted, no one would be surprised.
I think your point is: if that were the case, the messages wouldn't have been end-to-end encrypted, by definition. Which is fine. I'm saying we shouldn't trust a giant corporation making money off of selling personal data that it actually is end-to-end encrypted.
By the same token, don't trust Microsoft when they say Windows is secure.
Its a specific, technical phrase that means one thing only, and yes, googles RCS meets that standard:
https://support.google.com/messages/answer/10262381?hl=en
They have more technical information here if you want to deep dive about the literal implementation.
You shouldn't trust any corporation, but needless FUD detracts from their actual issues.
You are missing my point.
I don't deny the definition of E2EE. What I question is whether or not RCS does in fact meet the standard.
You provided a link from Google itself as verification. That is... not useful.
Has there been an independent audit on RCS? Why or why not?
Not that I can find. Can you post Signals most recent independent audit?
Many of these orgs don't post public audits like this. Its not common, even for the open source players like Signal.
What we do have is a megacorp stating its technical implementation extremely explicitly for a well defined security protocol, for a service meant to directly compete with iMessage. If they are violating that, it opens them up to huge legal liability and reputational harm. Neither of these is worth data mining this specific service.
I'm not suggesting that Signal is any better. I'm supporting absolute distrust until such information is available.
Here's all their independent audits:
https://community.signalusers.org/t/overview-of-third-party-security-audits/13243
Thank you. I had trouble running down a list.
I do consider Signal to be a more trustworthy org than Google clearly, but find this quibbling about them "maybe putting a super secret backdoor in the e2ee they use to compete with iMessage" to be pretty clear FUD.
Even if we assume they don't have a backdoor (which is probably accurate), they can still exfiltrate any data they want through Google Play services after it's decrypted.
They're an ad company, so they have a vested interest in doing that. So I don't trust them. If they make it FOSS and not rely on Google Play services, I might trust them, but I'd probably use a fork instead.
They can just claim archived or deleted messages don't qualify for end to end encryption in their privacy policy or something equally vague. If they invent their own program they can invent the loophole on how the data is processed
Or the content is encrypted, but the metadata isn't, so they can market to you based on who you talk to and what they buy, etc.
This part is likely, but not what we are talking about. Who you know and how you interact with them is separate from the fact that the content of the messages is not decryptable by anyone but the participants, by design. There is no "quasi" end to end. Its an either/or situation.
It doesn't matter if the content is encrypted in transit if Google can access the content in the app after decryption. That doesn't violate E2EE, and they could easily exfiltrate the data though Google Play Services, which is a hard requirement.
I don't trust them until the app is FOSS, doesn't rely on Google Play Services, and is independently verified to not send data or metadata to their servers. Until then, I won't use it.
Provided they have an open API and don't ban alternative clients, one can make something kinda similar to TOR in this system, taking from the service provider the identities and channels between them.
Meaning messages routed through a few hops over different users.
Sadly for all these services to have open APIs, there needs to be force applied. And you can't force someone far stronger than you and with the state on their side.
The messages are signed by cryptographic keys on the users phones that never leave the device. They are not decryptable in any way by google or anyone else. Thats the very nature of E2EE.
They cant fuck with it, at all, by design. That's the whole point. Even if they created "archived" messages to datamine, all they would have is the noise.
Exactly. We know corporations regularly use marketing and doublespeak to avoid the fact that they operate for their interests and their interests alone. Again, the interests of corporations are not altruistic, regardless of the imahe they may want to support.
Why should we trust them to "innovate" without independent audit?
End to end doesn't say anything about where keys are stored, it can be end to end encrypted and someone else have access to the keys.