GoldenBoobs at 2024-03-08 13:06:54+00:00 ID: ktwseft

Fordi agenterne på markedet, chokerende nok, slet ikke er så rationelle som dit argument forudsætter. Her er en ikke-udtømmende liste af potentielle forklaringer:

1. Principal-agent problems. Firms are typically not managed by their owners but by managers (agents) who act on the behalf of owners/shareholders (principals). While, owners might desire to maximize profits agents can to some degree act to pursue their own goals (see discussion in Hendrikse Economics and Management of Organizations).

For example, CEO might spend more lavishly on things like their private jet, limo, having HQ built by famous architect than profit maximizing CEO would. In the same way CEO/manager with taste for discrimination might pursue that taste even at the expense of profit (to a degree of course).

1. Consumers could have taste for discrimination. This is in fact classic example coming from one of the earliest work on discrimination. If consumers simply have preference for seeing men instead of women at some work and are willing to pay for satisfying this preference, there will be wage gap between men and women (see Mankiw Principles of Economics pp 395).

Mankiw has a good example of this for the race wage gap, but the logic of the example directly extends to gender wage gap

1. It could be result of government intervention (See discussion in Mankiw Principles of Economics pp 395).

For example, many governments around the world mandate that firms have to provide women with job guarantee during late pregnancy/mothers leave. Perks like these are costly and in competitive markets firms will just pass costs of these perks directly on their female employees (in form of lower wage - although this would not affect total compensation it is part of explanation for wage differentials).

1. Most labor markets are not perfect. In imperfect labor markets there are often quasi-rents to have that can be split between employee and employer. If for example women tend to be less assertive during negotiation (e.g. see Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), they might end up with less quasi-rents than their male counterparts (this argument is covered in greater detail in the Papayapap's answer).