this post was submitted on 11 Feb 2024
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The White House wants to 'cryptographically verify' videos of Joe Biden so viewers don't mistake them for AI deepfakes::Biden's AI advisor Ben Buchanan said a method of clearly verifying White House releases is "in the works."

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[–] [email protected] 7 points 9 months ago (2 children)

If you've been saying this for a long time please stop. This will solve nothing. It will be trivial to bypass for malicious actors and just hampers normal consumers.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 9 months ago (1 children)

You must be severely misunderstanding the idea. The idea is not to encrypt it in a way that it's only unlockable by a secret and hidden key, like DRM or cable TV does, but to do the the reverse - to encrypt it with a key that is unlockable by publicly available and widely shared key, where successful decryption acts as a proof of content authenticity. If you don't care about authenticity, nothing is stopping you from spreading the decrypted version, so It shouldn't affect consumers one bit. And I wouldn't describe "Get a bunch of cameras, rip the sensors out, carefully and repeatedly strip the top layers off and scan using electron microscope until you get to the encryption circuit, repeat enough times to collect enough scans undamaged by the stripping process to then manually piece them together and trace out the entire circuit, then spend a few weeks debugging it in a simulator to work out the encryption key" as "trivial"

[–] [email protected] 3 points 9 months ago (2 children)

I think you are misunderstanding things or don't know shit about cryptography. Why the fuck are y even talking about publicly unlockable encryption, this is a use case for verification like a MAC signature, not any kind of encryption.

And no, your process is wild. The actual answer is just replace the sensor input to the same encryption circuits. That is trivial if you own and have control over your own device. For your scheme to work, personal ownership rights would have to be severely hampered.

[–] [email protected] 2 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (1 children)

A MAC is symmetric and can thus only be verified by you or somebody who you trust to not misuse or leak the key. Regular digital signatures is what's needed here

You can still use such a signing circuit but treat it as an attestation by the camera's owner, not as independent proof of authenticity.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 9 months ago (1 children)

A MAC is symmetric and can thus only be verified by you or somebody who you trust to not misuse or leak the key.

You sign them against a known public key, so anybody can verify them.

Regular digital signatures is what's needed here You can still use such a signing circuit but treat it as an attestation by the camera's owner, not as independent proof of authenticity.

If it's just the cameras owner attesting, then just have them sign it. No need for expensive complicated circuits and regulations forcing these into existence.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 9 months ago

You can't use a MAC for public key signatures. That's ECC, RSA, and similar.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 9 months ago (1 children)

I think you are misunderstanding things or don’t know shit about cryptography. Why the fuck are y even talking about publicly unlockable encryption, this is a use case for verification like a MAC signature, not any kind of encryption.

Calm down. I was just dumbing down public key cryptography for you

The actual answer is just replace the sensor input to the same encryption circuits

This will not work. The encryption circuit has to be right inside the CCD, otherwise it will be bypassed just like TPM before 2.0 - by tampering with unencrypted connection in between the sensor and the encryption chip.

For your scheme to work, personal ownership rights would have to be severely hampered.

You still don't understand. It does not hamper with ownership rights or right to repair and you are free to not even use that at all. All this achieves is basically camera manufacturers signing every frame with "Yep, this was filmed with one of our cameras". You are free to view and even edit the footage as long as you don't care about this signature. It might not be useful for, say, a movie, but when looking for original, uncut and unedited footage, like, for example, a news report, this'll be a godsend.

[–] [email protected] 0 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (1 children)

Analog hole, just set up the camera in front of a sufficiently high resolution screen.

You have to trust the person who owns the camera.

[–] [email protected] 0 points 9 months ago (1 children)

Yes, I've mentioned that in the initial comment, and, I gotta confess, I don't know shit about photography, but to me it sounds like a very non-trivial task to make such shot appear legitimate.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 9 months ago

It's not. Wait till you find out how they made movies before CGI!

[–] [email protected] 1 points 9 months ago

Thank you, lol. This is what people end up with when they think of the first solution that comes to mind. Often just something that makes life harder for everyone EXCEPT bad actors. This just creates hoops for people following the rules to jump though while giving the impression the problem was solved, when it's not.