melmi

I can kind of see where he's coming from, but only if you're weighing it against an assumed future where we're going to die out tomorrow. That's a low bar for hopeful, and certainly not "100% positive".

I have a hard time seeing I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream or even worse, All Tomorrows, as "hopeful". I'd honestly rather just die.

Plus, not all sci-fi involves humans, and not all sci-fi is in the future. There's scifi with no humans in it, there's scifi set in the past or in an alternate present, and none of those qualify as "hopeful by default" in the way he defines it any more than any other fiction does.

But how will you get a "universal" view of the fediverse? No single authoritative view exists.

You yourself acknowledge that this is complicated, but I honestly don't understand what appeal a hacked together fake centralized system would have for people if they don't care about decentralization in the first place. Any such solution is almost inevitably gonna end up being janky and hacked together just to present a façade of worse Reddit.

Lemmy's strength is its decentralization and federation. It's not a problem to be solved, it's a feature that's attractive in its own right. It doesn't need mass appeal, it's a niche project and probably always will be. I don't think papering over the fundamental design of the software will make it meaningfully more attractive to the non-technically minded.

Yes, but only if your firewall is set to reject instead of drop. The documentation you linked mentions this; that's why open ports are listed as open|filtered because any port that's "open" might actually be being filtered (dropped).

On a modern firewall, an nmap scan will show every port as open|filtered, regardless of whether it's open or not.

Edit: Here's the relevant bit from the documentation:

The most curious element of this table may be the open|filtered state. It is a symptom of the biggest challenges with UDP scanning: open ports rarely respond to empty probes. Those ports for which Nmap has a protocol-specific payload are more likely to get a response and be marked open, but for the rest, the target TCP/IP stack simply passes the empty packet up to a listening application, which usually discards it immediately as invalid. If ports in all other states would respond, then open ports could all be deduced by elimination. Unfortunately, firewalls and filtering devices are also known to drop packets without responding. So when Nmap receives no response after several attempts, it cannot determine whether the port is open or filtered. When Nmap was released, filtering devices were rare enough that Nmap could (and did) simply assume that the port was open. The Internet is better guarded now, so Nmap changed in 2004 (version 3.70) to report non-responsive UDP ports as open|filtered instead.

Weirdly, we see it happen in the 23rd century before replicators were invented, so it was a "synthesizer", not a replicator.

WG uses UDP, so as long as your firewall is configured correctly it should be impossible to scan the open port. Any packet hitting the open port that isn't valid or doesn't have a valid key is just dropped, same as any ports that are closed.

Most modern firewalls default to dropping packets, so you won't be showing up in scans even with an open WG port.

Maybe. We might be getting into the weeds of unknowable philosophical questions here.

My belief is that my consciousness now is more or less the same as when I was young. But then, there's no way to know that, as we only exist in the current instant. It's possible I sprung into existence when I woke up this morning.

And yet I think that the claim "there's no continuity of consciousness, the You that existed yesterday is not the same You that exists now" is just as unprovable and thus unknowable as the claim that I am the same Experiencer that I always have been. We have no understanding of what consciousness even is.

To be honest I'm not really sure what consciousness "changing" means. I'm curious what you mean by that. In my mind, either it is or it isn't the same. It's just the thing that experiences my identity, my body, qualia. It's awareness itself.

I think some of the difficulty here boils down to the impossibility of defining consciousness itself.

Tbf, I don't often talk to children about work, and I don't think most adults would want me to talk to them like a child.

Plus, talking to children doesn't come naturally to everyone. It's certainly not fair to describe it as "very easy".

Exactly. Even as a new me lives on, with the same identity, it isn't the same individual. The Me who walked into the teleporter will die, and never wake up again.

I don't care about the continuity of my identity, I care about the continuity of my consciousness. My identity changes over time, but it's always Me who experiences that identity.

I would rather have my identity radically change, but continue to be the one to experience it, than have my identity continue, but have it be a part of a different consciousness.

It only matters in that a person died. A person with their own subjective experience that they no longer get to experience. It doesn't matter that in this case I inherited their memories, and it doesn't matter when it happened other than out of curiosity. I'd mourn them the same.

And as for how I would know... If I'm the clone? Obviously I would never have any way to know, short of someone coming up to me. On the other hand if I were the original, I would "know" because I would be dead. (Or rather, I wouldn't know anything, because the dead don't experience or think)

Edit: It matters that I inherited their memories in that it might influence the way I see the world, my identity, and their death, but it wouldn't change the fact that I mourn them. I am a distinct person from other versions of me, regardless of whether I'm a clone or they're a clone, and if they die it's just as much a tragedy as any other human death.

Except the person who died is dead, and they stay dead. The person who died's final moments will be seeing their clone standing over them, and their memories will diverge.

They're clearly different meat, different consciousnesses in that moment. They won't know what the other is thinking, they will have to speak to communicate.

How are they not separate people in that moment?

Of course I wouldn't know. But the former me who got dragged off is dead. That's the whole point, the clone has no way of knowing and simply continues on life while the original dies.

And because we only exist in the present, we rely on our memories of the past to tell who we are. Our memories tell me I'm me, so I think I'm me.

Maybe it doesn't matter to you, but the reason I don't want to die is because I want to be aware. If I am never conscious again, but a copy of me is, good for them I guess, I wish them the best, but it's not what I want. I'm not conscious of waking up in the morning, even if they're me. I'm dead.

Fundamentally, no. It doesn't matter if the copy is identical in every way, it's physically separate.

The fact that one is the "original" and one is the "copy" doesn't matter. The fidelity of the copy doesn't matter. It's literally just the fact that it's different meat.

The copy will believe it's me, and will for any outside observer be identical to me, but I will still exist as a separate entity. Up until the next instant, where the clone-and-kill machine enters the next phase, kills me, and I'm gone, and there's a new copy of me out there with a new consciousness, living my life. But the version of me who was me is dead.

What happens if it doesn't kill me instantly? What happens if I get to look my transporter clone in the eyes? We won't have the same consciousness, we'll have two separate copies of the same consciousness. And then it kills me. And I watch myself die.