Sad, but some of us make a living out of this. But still sad (and true).
Of course if that was not the case we could employ our sorry minds to something more constructive.
Sad, but some of us make a living out of this. But still sad (and true).
Of course if that was not the case we could employ our sorry minds to something more constructive.
Stop giving me your toughest battles
IoCs from original research:
Hashes
267071df79927abd1e57f57106924dd8a68e1c4ed74e7b69403cdcdf6e6a453b 54/70
d6ac21a409f35a80ba9ccfe58ae1ae32883e44ecc724e4ae8289e7465ab2cf40 54/71
ad4d196b3d85d982343f32d52bffc6ebfeec7bf30553fa441fd7c3ae495075fc
13c017cb706ef869c061078048e550dba1613c0f2e8f2e409d97a1c0d9949346
b376a3a6bae73840e70b2fa3df99d881def9250b42b6b8b0458d0445ddfbc044
Domains
hanagram[.]jpthefinetreats[.]com
caduff-sa[.]chjeepcarlease[.]com
buy-new-car[.]com
carleasingguru[.]com
IP Addresses
91[.]193[.]18[.]120
IoCs:
IOCs Hashes (SHA-256) Email – 16e6dfd67d5049ffedb8c55bee6ad80fc0283757bc60d4f12c56675b1da5bf61
Docx – 1abf56bc5fbf84805ed0fbf28e7f986c7bb2833972793252f3e358b13b638bb1
Injected ZIP – 95898c9abce738ca53e44290f4d4aa4e8486398de3163e3482f510633d50ee6c
LNK file – d07323226c7be1a38ffd8716bc7d77bdb226b81fd6ccd493c55b2711014c0188
Final ZIP – 94499196a62341b4f1cd10f3e1ba6003d0c4db66c1eb0d1b7e66b7eb4f2b67b6 26/64
Client32.exe – 89f0c8f170fe9ea28b1056517160e92e2d7d4e8aa81f4ed696932230413a6ce1 26/73
URLs and Hostnames yourownmart[.]com/solar[.]txt
firstieragency[.]com/depbrndksokkkdkxoqnazneifidmyyjdpji[.]txt
yourownmart[.]com
firstieragency[.]com
parabmasale[.]com
tapouttv28[.]com
IP Addresses 192[.]236[.]192[.]48
173[.]252[.]167[.]50
199[.]188[.]205[.]15
46[.]105[.]141[.]54
Others Message ID contains: “sendinblue[.]com”
Return Path contains: “sender-sib[.]com”
Normally web filters categorize IPFS gateways as p2p, and most organizations block this category.
From the text:
Now, attackers breach a user's mobile account with stolen, brute-forced, or leaked credentials and initiate porting the victim's number to another device on their own. They can do this by generating a QR code through the hijacked mobile account that can be used to activate a new eSIM. They then scan it with their device, essentially hijacking the number.
No need for social engineering.
Unfortunately, this is the really not only for Meta, but most of social platforms, gaming, e-commerce, not to mention gambling.
Not following... Since this is a cybersecurity com, I assume that many of us work in this area, literally defending people and organizations from attackers and scammers. That's why I said some of us make a living out of this in a sad way.