this post was submitted on 07 Jul 2023
2 points (100.0% liked)

Credible Defense

436 readers
11 users here now

An unofficial counterpart to the subreddit r/CredibleDefense, intended to be a supplementary resource and potential fallback point. If you are an active moderator over there, please don't hesitate to contact me to be given a moderation position.

Wiki Glossary of Common Terms and Abbreviations. (Request an addition)

General Rules

Strive to be informative, professional, gracious, and encouraging in your communications with other members here. Imagine writing to a superior in the Armed Forces, or a colleague in a think tank or major investigative journal.

This is not at all intended to be US-centric; posts relating to other countries are highly encouraged.

No blind partisanship. We aim to study defense, not wage wars behind keyboards. Defense views from or about all countries are welcome so long as they are credible.

If you have experience in relevant fields, understand your limitations. Just because you work in the defense arena does not mean you are always correct.

Please refrain from linking the sub outside of here and a small number of other subs (LCD, NCD, War College, IR_Studies, NCDiplomacy, AskHistorians). This helps control site growth (especially limiting surges) and filters people toward those with a stronger interest.

No denial of war crimes or genocide.

Comments

Should be substantive and contribute to discussion.

No image macros, GIFs, emojis or memes.

No AI-generated content.

Don’t be abrasive/insulting.

No one-liners, jokes, insults, shorthand, etc. Avoid excessive sarcasm or snark.

Sources are highly encouraged, but please do not link to low-quality sources such as RT, New York Post, The National Interest, CGTN, etc. unless they serve a useful purpose.

Be polite and informative to others here, and remember that we should be able to disagree without being disagreeable.

Do not accuse or personally challenge others, rather ask them for sources and why they have their opinions.

Do not ask others about their background as it is rude and not encouraging of others to have an open discussion.

Please do no not make irrelevant jokes, offtopic pun threads, use sarcasm, respond to a title of a piece without reading it, or in general make comments that add nothing to the discussion. Please refrain from top-level jokes. Humor is appreciated, but it should be infrequent and safe for a professional environment.

Please do not blindly advocate for a side in a conflict or a country in general. Surely there are many patriots here, but this is not the arena to fight those battles.

Asking questions in the comment section of a submission, or in a megathread, is a great way to start a conversation and learn.

Submissions

Posts should include a substantial text component. This does not mean links are banned, instead, they should be submitted as part of the text post. Posts should not be quick updates or short-term. They should hold up and be readable over time, so you will be glad that you read them months or years from now.

Links should go to credible, high-quality sources (academia, government, think tanks), and the body should be a brief summary plus some comments on what makes it good or insightful.

Essays/Effortposts are encouraged. Essays/Effortposts are text posts you make that have an underlying thesis or attempt to synthesize information. They should cite sources, be well-written, and be relatively long. An example of an excellent effort post is this.

Please use the original title of the work (or a descriptive title; de-editorializing/de-clickbaiting is acceptable), and possibly a sub-headline.

Refrain from submissions that are quick updates in title form, troop movements, ship deployments, terrorist attacks, announcements, or the crisis du jour.

Discussions of opinion pieces by distinguished authors, historical research, and research on warfare relating to national security issues are encouraged.

We are primarily a reading forum, so please no image macros, gifs, emojis, or memes.

~~Moderators will manually approve all posts.~~ Posting is unrestricted for the moment, but posts without a submission statement or that do not meet the standards above will be removed.

No Leaked Material

Please do not submit or otherwise link to classified material. And please take discussions of classified material to a more secure location.

In general, avoid any information that will endanger anyone.

#Please report items that violate these rules. We don’t know about it unless you point it out.

We maintain lists of sources so that anyone can help to find interesting open-source material to share. As outlets wax and wane in quality, please help us keep the list updated:

https://reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/wiki/credibleoutlets

founded 1 year ago
MODERATORS
 

Submission Statement

Recent attempts by private US citizens to negotiate directly with the Russian government have brought renewed attention to the topic of conflict termination. This article by Oriana Skylar Mastro and David A Siegel discusses the forces and conditions which drive countries to the negotiating table, as well as those which may incentivize leaders to refuse negotiations. The authors introduce the concept of "resiliency", the capacity for a state to resist further escalation. States are concerned that the act of opening up negotiations will be perceived as further weakness, giving their opponent an incentive to double down or increase the intensity of their attacks Conditions and actions which reduce the risk of escalation or increase resiliency should therefore increase the chance of states opening negotiations. One way this can occur is through signaling resiliency by the state currently refusing negotiations. The goal is to disincentivize escalation in response to a signal of weakness by showing that said state is capable of resisting further escalation, such as through a "costly signal". Another is the assessment by one party that the other finds further escalation to be too costly. An important note is that states see these costs as blows to their perception, independent of the actual state of the battlefield. As a result, the authors find that "face-saving measures", like unilaterally reducing the intensity of a conflict, are less effective than might be hoped because they fail to address the perception of vulnerability that states see as the true cost of negotiation. This dynamic holds while states have high resiliency, where they can be confident that further escalation by their opponent will not result in their outright defeat. When states have low resilience(in other words, when they are lo longer able to prevent or resist the opponent's escalation), they may open negotiations at the first opportunity, choosing to accept the costs of being perceived as weak in order to avoid the greater costs of an outright defeat.

The implications for the conflict in Ukraine are clear. First and foremost, this article is a strong rebuttal to the idea put forth by Haass and Kupchan that the West can compel Ukraine to the negotiating table while continuing to provide sufficient aid to repel further Russian attempts at conquest. As long as Ukraine remains a "high-resiliency" state, capable of credibly defeating Russian escalation, they will be loathe to give an impression of weakness that could incentivize Russia to double down. Similarly, given that Russia's entire thesis of victory rests on the idea of the West eventually exhausting its will for escalation and ceasing its aid to Ukraine, Haass and Kupchan's decision to open negotiations with Russia signals that the West is reaching that point of "low-resiliency", where it is looking to cuts its losses with early negotiation. This in turn would be an incentive for Russia to further escalate, on the presumption that the West will be unable to prevent or impose costs for doing so.

Oriana Skylar Mastro is a fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank.

David A Siegel is in the Department of Political Science at Duke University

Getting belligerents to the negotiating table is complicated and fraught with difficulties, both in theory and practice. A willingness to talk is seen as the first concession, affecting an adversary’s beliefs about the balance of power and resolve long before offers are exchanged. Assuming, as is often done, that talks occur during fighting inhibits our understanding of the process of war. This article contributes to our understanding of conflict and its negotiated conclusion by proposing a novel mechanism to explain why rational states may refuse to talk during war and when they might change their positions. We find that states are willing to open negotiations under two conditions: when their opponents find escalation too costly, and when there is a signal of high resilience that only the highly resilient care to use.

Those findings have important policy implications. Political scientists have long recognized the dilemma of compellence—states may be reluctant to give in because of concerns that they are opening themselves up to even more coercion (Schelling, 1966). We show that states may be reluctant to show a willingness to talk for the same reason, and therefore, it can be counterproductive to attempt to coerce an enemy to the negotiating table. Todd Sechser (2010: 649) recommends that the stronger country issuing the compellent threat offer side payments or make lesser demands to assuage the reputational costs the target states may pay for acquiescing to deal with such challenges.

Our findings suggest a different explanation: states are concerned with the negative material consequences that their approach to diplomacy may convey to the enemy, and so face-saving measures emanating from the enemy do not allow a state to save face. After all, it would remain clear to the enemy that a decision to adopt an open stance signaled weakness, and that adverse inference would still yield the potential for escalation by the enemy. While the limitations of face-saving measures emanating from the adversary are discouraging, our findings suggest new opportunities for outside mediators, who can provide guarantees in ways that lessen the strategic costs of conversation.

An ever-increasing number of modern wars are limited conflicts that end in negotiated settlement (Pillar, 1983). Understanding how military outcomes translate into political outcomes—how combat outcomes and diplomatic behavior interact to affect the likelihood that all sides will come to the table—is of greater importance than ever before. This article sheds light on the factors that influence states’ decisions about talking to the enemy during wars and illustrates how future generations of policymakers can shape those factors for peace.

no comments (yet)
sorted by: hot top controversial new old
there doesn't seem to be anything here