Cybersecurity

Wi-Fi-based Positioning Systems (WPSes) are used by modern mobile devices to learn their position using nearby Wi-Fi access points as landmarks. In this work, we show that Apple's WPS can be abused to create a privacy threat on a global scale. We present an attack that allows an unprivileged attacker to amass a worldwide snapshot of Wi-Fi BSSID geolocations in only a matter of days. Our attack makes few assumptions, merely exploiting the fact that there are relatively few dense regions of allocated MAC address space. Applying this technique over the course of a year, we learned the precise locations of over 2 billion BSSIDs around the world. The privacy implications of such massive datasets become more stark when taken longitudinally, allowing the attacker to track devices' movements. While most Wi-Fi access points do not move for long periods of time, many devices -- like compact travel routers -- are specifically designed to be mobile. We present several case studies that demonstrate the types of attacks on privacy that Apple's WPS enables: We track devices moving in and out of war zones (specifically Ukraine and Gaza), the effects of natural disasters (specifically the fires in Maui), and the possibility of targeted individual tracking by proxy -- all by remotely geolocating wireless access points. We provide recommendations to WPS operators and Wi-Fi access point manufacturers to enhance the privacy of hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Finally, we detail our efforts at responsibly disclosing this privacy vulnerability, and outline some mitigations that Apple and Wi-Fi access point manufacturers have implemented both independently and as a result of our work.

The TP-Link Archer C5400X gaming router is vulnerable to security flaws that could enable an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute commands on the device.

Threat actors are targeting Check Point Remote Access VPN devices in an ongoing campaign to breach enterprise networks, the company warned in a Monday advisory.

or why it is not a good idea to use your birthday as your pin

Abstract

Spyware makes surveillance simple. The last ten years have seen a global market emerge for ready-made software that lets governments surveil their citizens and foreign adversaries alike and to do so more easily than when such work required tradecraft. The last ten years have also been marked by stark failures to control spyware and its precursors and components. This Article accounts for and critiques these failures, providing a socio-technical history since 2014, particularly focusing on the conversation about trade in zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits. Second, this Article applies lessons from these failures to guide regulatory efforts going forward. While recognizing that controlling this trade is difficult, I argue countries should focus on building and strengthening multilateral coalitions of the willing, rather than on strong-arming existing multilateral institutions into working on the problem. Individually, countries should focus on export controls and other sanctions that target specific bad actors, rather than focusing on restricting particular technologies. Last, I continue to call for transparency as a key part of oversight of domestic governments' use of spyware and related components.

Keywords: cybersecurity, zero-day vulnerabilities, international law, espionage

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Two weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a large, mysterious new Internet hosting firm called Stark Industries Solutions materialized and quickly became the epicenter of massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on government and commercial targets in Ukraine and Europe. An investigation into Stark Industries reveals it is being used as a global proxy network that conceals the true source of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns against enemies of Russia.

I'm new to the cyber-security/privacy space. I am interested in teaching myself about it, as well as dabbling in OSINT and general linux-type-stuff too. ATM this is all a hobby so while it is not crucial to have everything air-tight, I would like to do my best to follow best practices.

That being said, I am currently using a Mac M1 so my VM capabilities are (AFAIK) limited to the OS's provided by the UTM virtual machine software. For those who are unaware, the OS's they provide can be found here:

https://mac.getutm.app/gallery/

From a security/privacy perspective, which of these OS's would you consider to be the most secure or, able to be the most secure with configuration? At first glance and with my limited knowledge, I want to say Kali, but I feel this may be cliché as it's what your stereotypical-hacker-type would use.

Any guidance would be appreciated.

N.B., ease of use/convenience is not a top priority for me, as I'm using this as a learning experience and I'm open to trying different things and making mistakes along the way.

Thanks!

***EDIT: Thank you to all who provided information. I learned a lot. I've decided to try a few different distros that work with UTM namely, Parrot OS (both home and security editions for different purposes), as well as Kali and Debian.